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Abstract. The main causes of over-fishing are not biological or environmental, but 
rather economic overexploitation of the ocean’s fishing resources. Since the problem is an 
economic issue, the response has to also be in the economic realm. Proper fisheries 
management and restrictions on fleets’ capacity (including the issue of fishery subsidies) 
would be very effective. A retreat from the subsidies in fisheries would considerably contribute 
to the conservation and sustainable use of fish stocks. However, a full retreat from the 
subsidies in fisheries seems to be unrealistic. Consequently a compromise has to be made and 
appropriate restrictions are needed not to distort positive environmental-friendly trends in 
subsidizing and to protect the interests of the developing fishing states. The number of people 
employed in fishing industry is growing every year, especially in developing countries. This 
regime would require a strong coordination and co-operation of governments and international 
organizations.  
Introduction 
 
Ocean fish numbers around 28,000 different types of species. This is more than the number of amphibians, 
reptiles, birds or mammals on the entire planet. It seems just innumerable… Nevertheless, humanity has 
succeeded in over fishing.  
Many ocean fishes are ancient species that existed on the earth for more than 450 million years before 
the dinosaurs began roaming. For this reason alone, they deserve careful treatment and special protection. But 
besides this, fishes are such an essential source of protein and other nutrients in the human diet, as well as in 
the diets of multiple other animal and bird species, that their depletion seems almost unthinkable.  
 The international community has started to combat over fishing by different means and techniques: 
fishing of some species is totally prohibited, while for other species seasonal quotas, protection during the 
spawning season and minimum mesh sizes have been established (Tomasevich, 1971 p. 46).  
Biological solutions like these have not worked out, however. This is not surprising, since the main 
causes of over fishing are not biological or environmental, but rather economic overexploitation of the 
ocean’s fishing resources. Since the problem is an economic one, the appropriate response to it also has to be 
an economic one. Proper fisheries management and restrictions on fleets’ capacity (including the issue of 
fishery subsidies) also would be very effective.  
However, today’s model of economic globalization presumes an open multilateral trading system 
functioning like clockwork. Is the restriction or abolition of fishery subsidies workable under today’s 
economic circumstances? How should these issues be treated so as to not distort the global market, or ruin 
the already troubled fishing industry? What kind of legal frameworks should it have? This paper attempts to 
find some solutions to the foregoing problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
∗  This article was first published in  Kierkegaard, Sylvia,  (2007)  International Law and Trade: Bridging the 
East-West Divide, IAITL , pp. 125-140 
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1. Environmental and economical background 
 
1.1 Overfishing 
 
Fishing is one of the oldest human professions. Since the Middle Ages, it has been an organized industry 
(e.g., the catch of herring in northern Europe). The 15th century was marked by the beginning of organized 
catches of cod on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. In the 17th century whaling fleets put to sea. Excluding 
some particular concerns (e.g., in the 14th century in England, special trawls with a fine mesh 
(wondyrchoums) killed enormous numbers of fish), humanity was almost sure until the 19th century that the 
ocean’s fish stocks were inexhaustible (Policansky, 1995 p. 652). Even in the 19th century, British biologist 
Thomas Huxley proclaimed the endless resources of fish in the ocean (Pearse, 1996 p. 12). 
Since fishes were considered inexhaustible, access to them was entirely open and unregulated. Over 
time, this open access to the sea’s resources became increasingly harmful. The lack of adequate management 
of the fisheries also contributed to the problem. The resulting overcapitalization and over fishing first led to 
such “global” decisions as revocation of such Grotius premises as “inexhaustibility of resources and 
insusceptibility to appropriation” (Knight, 1977 p. 27). 
In the 20th century, not only easily accessible stocks of fish but also more elusive mammalian species 
(seals, otters, blue and right whales) declined. By the end of World War II, overfishing had become a critical 
problem.  
Presently, around 60% of the major species are under threat: a fully utilized half of all species and an 
over fished quarter. The problem is even beyond one of “sustainability”: it is already acute for the current 
generation, let alone for future generations. Biologists warn: in some cases the fishing stocks can never be 
renewed, since their over fishing could just remove the stock forever from the ecosystem. 
Biologist Garrett Hardin called this over fishing problem the “tragedy of the commons”. A resource 
that belongs to everyone and no one, the ocean’s fish stocks have become a problem which everybody 
concerned, directly or indirectly, has to solve. This includes not only biologists and environmentalists, but the 
fishing industry as well. Ordinary consumers play a role too by buying threatened species at the grocery 
store. 
Both biological and economic solutions are being applied to the over fishing problem. The question 
arises whether fisheries management should also be corrected from the economic point of view (Meany, 1986 
p.  45). Should the free market system be restricted for environmental reasons?  
The legal answers have already partly been found. The principle of the freedom of fishing on the high 
seas, declared in the customary law of the sea, had to be revised, or rather corrected, in light of overfishing. 
Arts. 61, 62 and 65 UNCLOS provide rather general rights and obligations of coastal states concerning their 
living resources in the EEZ. The main response is given in multilateral and bilateral treaties. The freedom of 
fishing was (and continues to be) restricted and subjected to specific conditions. 
 
1.2 Fleets overcapacity  
 
However, the main danger lies not in the open access to fish resources, but in the technological progress. 
Even whales were endangered only after the invention of the harpoon gun.  
The freedom of fishing on the high seas (at least until the 20th century) and high prices for tuna, 
billfish, salmon and squid promoted high competition between states and, as a consequence, development of 
modernized vessels and more effective fishing methods. Governments, under these conditions of high 
competition, increased their fleets’ capacity as much as possible, providing partial subsidies to their fishing 
industries.  
This led to what we have now: fishing fleets that are “overbuilt” (Warren, 1994 p. 2). In other words, 
the amount of input money or capital oversteps the oceans’ productive capacity. First, too many fishing fleets 
are catching too few fish (overcapitalization). Second, the new, more effective ways of fishing, like large-
scale drift nets or advanced gear types and new technologies such as GPS, have drastically increased the 
fleets’ capacity. 
Natural checks on overfishing, such as the “self-renewal” of fish stocks, no longer help since fish no 
longer have time to reproduce their numbers (Peel, 1995 p. 1). Fisheries resources are finite—that’s why 
proper management and certain restrictions upon catches are unavoidable if fish stocks are to be preserved at 
any level (Johnston, 1987 p. 3). 
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As far back as 1989, the available capacity of fishing fleets was already one-third more than what is 
needed to catch all the available fish. Currently, the fleets’ harvesting capacity exceeds the amount of 
available fishing resources by far more than that. Today’s capacity of the Canadian cod fleet alone is more 
than what is necessary to catch all the Atlantic cod stocks. According to the FAO’s data, 4 million vessels 
constituted the world fishing fleet in 2004. 
The current situation can be summarized as: the catching capacity continues to grow, the fishing 
resources continue to decrease. The threatening trends are having no significant effect on the fishing 
industry’s practices: world fish harvests continue to rise at the expense of the more than three times 
overexploited fishing resources (even cod and herring). 
Now humanity faces another challenge: how to reduce fleets (Iudicello, 1999 p. 70). 
One of the primary solutions would be to reduce the fleets’ capacity. However, its growth has been in 
many respects shaped by government subsidies. While the connection between overfishing and overcapacity 
is unquestionable, the role of government subsidies in overfishing is more questionable. Besides, 86% of the 
world’s decked vessels operate in Asia, 1.3% in Africa and 0.6% in South America – all in developing 
countries. Restrictions on fisheries subsidies could be catastrophic for the economies of these regions. 
In 1990, independent experts directly indicated the need to reduce fishing capacity by at least 40%. 
Even the EU’s Multiannual Guidance Programme (MAGP) for 1987 – 1991 stressed the need (not in a 
mandatory manner), however on a smaller scale (a recommended decrease of 3% in gross tonnage). Yet, 
except for two “obedient” member states, all the rest actually increased their fleet capacities and related 
subsidies. 
Overcapitalization brings only a short-term increase in profit to fleets. Inevitably, overfishing reduces 
the gains for all fishermen. Poor management practices also add to the environmental problem. Thus, a 
solution to the global problem of overfishing is essential not only for environmental reasons but for economic 
ones, since in any case—with or without subsidies—overfishing sooner or later hurts states’ budgets. 
 
2. Fisheries subsidies and international trade 
 
2.1 WTO development and mandate 
 
On 1 January 1995, GATT’s successor – the WTO – was established to govern and regulate international 
trade as a successful result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTNs). A coherent 
system of global economic governance, together with the IMF and the World Bank, was finally in place 
(Wilkinson, 2000 p. 11). 
The current mandate of the WTO is strictly trade-oriented (Article III, WTO agreement). The WTO 
was created explicitly for the administration and implementation of trade agreements, and as a forum for 
multilateral trade negotiations, settlement of disputes, and review of national trade policies.  
The question of whether the WTO’s mandate should be broadened is being actively debated. On the 
agenda for possible inclusion are policies for investment, competition, policies for controlling government 
corruption and labour standards (Blackhurst, 1998 p. 46). 
Already, the preamble of the WTO makes a reference to “sustainable development”—defining the 
new goal or new direction in the WTO’s activity. It also served as “a rationale for the formal creation” of the 
CTE. The position of environmental matters in world trade policy is therefore indisputable. Its importance 
becomes steadily clearer. Environmental clauses could be found in the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures and Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. The significance of environmental 
issues and sustainable development within the WTO was stressed once more in the Ministerial Decision on 
Trade and the Environment issued at Marrakech (Adamantopoulos, 1997 p. 81). 
On the other hand, some attempts to link trade and other policy matters have already been 
unsuccessful, so the fear has been expressed that integration of environmental issues into the multilateral 
trade order is just “a repetition of past mistakes” (Roessler, 1998 p. 221). Today’s preference of trade over 
the environment was perfectly shown in the tuna-dolphin dispute between Mexico and the U.S., tried by the 
GATT panel. The reason of protection of environment (or rather Mexico’s environmentally incorrect policy 
on dolphins by the tuna harvesting) due to "extra-territoriality": the environmental exceptions under GATT 
are admissible only within domestic borders or jurisdiction. There was a concern that otherwise this 
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precedent would have allowed banning product imports only because of the differences between the 
environmental policy of the importing and exporting countries.  
“Technically” environmental issues do not contradict trade issues. The WTO rules do not in any way 
disturb the environmental aims and policies. The only problem is to make the principle of equivalence 
between free trade and environmental protection a reality. It is obvious that it is impossible to liberate the 
trade and protect the environment at once. Such close linkage between environmental and trade issues could 
rather lead to the manipulating of both of them in the “international bargaining”. 
The creation of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) was a clear recognition of the 
trade implications and interrelationship with the environment and a big step toward sound and sustainable 
trade policies. In 1997 – 1998 CTE repeatedly grappled with the question of x whether fisheries subsidies 
negatively impact fish stocks and whether such subsidies require for special treatment. 
The Uruguay Round clearly puts the issue of fisheries’ subsidies under the WTO scope of activity and 
included under the coverage of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) (by the way 
not applicable for agriculture). 
 
2.2 WTO and fisheries subsidies 
 
2.2.1 WTO Doha round 
 
Since May 1997 the issue of the fisheries subsidies was raised within the WTO CTE. The CTE dealt with this 
matter for several years. The global character of fisheries and increasing concerns around subsidies in this 
industry placed this issue on the agenda of the following round of WTO negotiations. In November 2000, the 
WTO held its Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha (Qatar).  
The Doha WTO round started general negotiations on the disputable issues of the Agreements on 
Implementation on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Paragraph 28 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration contains the mandate on clarification and improvement of disciplines on fisheries subsidies. It 
was agreed there to launch negotiations on WTO’s role on the issue of fisheries subsidies.  
After this conference WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, under the authority of the WTO Trade 
Negotiations Committee has been dealing with the questions of subsidies in fishery. However, the Doha 
round does not give a special mandate or authorization to the WTO Members to develop special disciplines 
on fisheries subsidies. It would be the first step out of the trade-oriented WTO mission.  
The environmental issues, as previously mentioned, are not an empty space for the WTO. However, 
now they are rather generally proclaimed then concretely implemented. The consideration of such 
environmental issues within the WTO would be not only a great move towards sustainability, but even a 
historic step for the WTO.  
 
2.2.2  Fisheries Subsidies 
 
Overfishing and overcapacity led to the situation in the fishing industry, where revenues in this industry are 
exceeded by costs. In this case it would be logical to presume that fishermen should start to leave the fishery 
(Cunningham, Dunn, Whitmarsch, 1985 p. 98). However, it is not necessarily true. For the increase of the 
fishermen’s income government support could be provided. This support is usually referred to as subsidies. 
In fisheries they are granted per unit weight of fish landed. The rates of subsidies differentiate depending on 
the type of fish, its geographical location, the type of fishing vessel or fishing gear, and time of year chosen 
for the catch (Mollett, 1986 p. 60). 
Fishing subsidies are used by all countries with a fishing industry (McDorman, 1999 p. 510). The 
world leaders in fishing subsidies are Canada, US and EC. Not only domestic fishing could be subsidized. 
Sometimes governments also support the fishing in foreign waters. 
Subsidies favour certain activity by means of corresponding government policy. Subsidies could look 
like tax breaks, lending preferences, grants or even research and development or marketing. Subsidies can 
also take the forms of costs reductions, like reduced costs for fuel, reduced or absent fees for use, outright 
grants, employment support or support of competitiveness in foreign markets. For example, fuel, bait, ice and 
other inputs prices or taxes can be reduced or special grants for the improvement of safety could be provided. 
EU used such forms of subsidies as re-deployment agreements with other countries. A number of African 
states received not only an access to the European vessels, but also special grants and fees. 
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As a result of subsidies, Canada’s Northwest Atlantic offshore fleet increased its capacity more than 
18 times. The subsidies of the EC fleet in 70s and 80s for its modernization doubled the gross registered 
tonnage, tripled its engine power and caused major declines of major fish species in EC waters. 
Since the fees for the use of a public resource are reduced or eliminated, the level of their 
consumption increases. Even if the revenues are lower than costs, the catch continues. The prices are 
decreasing and demand is increasing. Subsidies strongly promote the use of technologies for the fishing 
vessels, leading to the overcapacity and overexploitation of fishing resources ("too many boats are chasing 
too few fish"). This negative result of subsidies is proven not only for the fishing resources. The forests have 
also been overused because of the subsidies. 
Economic theory also proves that in the absence of proper sustainable fisheries management, subsidies 
promote fleets overcapacity.  
The final negative result of the fisheries’ subsidies was demonstrated by the following example. The 
subsidizing of a fishing fleet with the aim of its expansion and modernization since the 1960s in Canada 
finally caused depletion of the populations of Atlantic cod towards the end of the 1980s. Canada was 
competing with Europe in catches by distant-water trawlers. Because of that competition, Canada introduced 
the direct grants and low-interest loans for construction of new and modernization of old vessels. The amount 
of large trawlers increased, and finally exceeded the capacity needed for catch of the annual quota five times. 
The depletion of the fish stocks (including cod) eventually caused the “financial ruin” of the fleet. The 
Canadian government was forced to intervene again with assistance and supporting programs and payments. 
The Atlantic Fisheries Adjustment Program (AFAP) in 1990 of the Canadian government was aimed 
to reduce the number of fishermen, to develop the new fisheries and new kinds of activities for fishing 
communities. For laid-off plant workers, even special funds and new jobs were provided. A bit later even a 
moratorium on cod fishing and emergency assistance payments to fishermen and fish plant workers were 
introduced. The Northern Cod Adjustment and Recovery Program (NCARP) purposed to reduce the number 
of fishermen by means of early retirement payments and purchasing fishing licenses. However, fishermen 
just waited out the moratorium rather than seek other lines of work. 
The EU is one of the largest “subsidizers” of the fisheries sector. Within the EU ($2.2 billion of 
fisheries subsidies per year), Denmark, Spain and France lead in the subsidizing of fisheries industry. The EU 
subsidizes its fisheries under the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) with structural 
assistance to the fisheries and provides for special payments for fishing access to the waters of third 
countries. In addition, the EU itself subsidizes fisheries industry. Member states subsidize their fleets 
independently (State aid), however only after the Commission’s approval. EU subsidies take the form of 
mostly non-capital grants and collective projects supporting local fisheries management and environmental-
friendly initiatives.  
Economically, these subsidies are not justified, since almost all of the subsidized vessels within the 
EU would be profitable without subsidies. However, as a result of these subsidies, the EU is one of the 
largest importers of fish products and the EU waters are extremely over fished. Indeed, most of the 
endangered fish species are also within the EU waters. 
In the course of time,  the harmful impact of the subsidies has been more or less officially recognized. 
Even the reverse subsidy programs were launched to decrease the fishing capacity of fleet: some vessels were 
scrapped, while some fishing licenses were bought back. These programs were, however, insufficient in 
range and effectiveness. For example, the EU started to reduce its fleet in 1983, but continued to subsidize 
the construction and modernization of vessels. 
Since the end of the 80s, the negative effect of the fisheries subsidies has become a focus of concern at 
the government level, and more detailed analyses have been conducted. In 1993,  the FAO finally published 
worldwide estimations for fishing subsidies. Studies showed that the revenues out of fishing industry were 
less than operating costs, by about $22 billion. The costs of depreciation, return on investment, servicing of 
debt on the vessels themselves, not considered during the study, would constitute additional $10 billion. 
Apart from the expensive overcapacity of the fishing fleet and subsequent low market price of the fishing 
vessels (out of the specialized use of this kind of vessels), partly these losses were caused by subsidies. These 
are disturbing results… 
Fisheries subsidies undermine not only the sustainability of the fishing resources. They also 
significantly undermine the efforts of effective fisheries management, simultaneously damaging the 
environment and distorting the trade. The practice shows that the introduced subsidies “settle down” and 
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become almost irremovable.  Governments provide for insufficient information on fisheries subsidies or even 
make it confidential. This makes it difficult to estimate real impact of subsidies on fisheries sector. 
The subsidizing of the fishing fleet continues. The attempts to reduce it face strong political 
opposition especially from the side of the lobbying sectors of the food industry. The problem with subsidies 
is that government grants also are able in some cases to reduce fleets capacity. Environmental subsidies, 
applied by the EU, Japan, Canada, and the United States, try to eliminate the harmful results of the 
overfishing and fleets overcapacity (e.g. buying back of vessel and fishing permissions, fishermen retraining 
programs etc.) 
Withdrawal of subsidies in fisheries would considerably contribute to the conservation and sustainable 
use of fish stocks. However, a full retreat from the subsidies in fisheries seems to be unrealistic. The 
appropriate restrictions have to be made reasonable not to distort positive environmental-friendly trends in 
subsidizing and to protect the interests of the developing fishing states. The number of people employed in 
the fishing industry is growing every year, particularly in developing countries. Around 80% of fisheries 
subsidies of the developing countries are caused by their wish to preserve this employment.  
 
2.2.3 WTO legislative basis 
 
Governmental subsidies distorting international trade, in general, were one of the most intractable problems 
in the development of international trade law (Thomas, Meyer, 1997 p. 150). From the economic point of 
view, subsidies lead to the misallocation of economic resources: overproduction and hindered market on the 
one hand, and deficient governmental budgets on the other hand. 
Governmental subsidies are used to lower the producers’ production costs. They establish an artificial 
price advantage. Not only trade, but also international division of labour (Siebert, 2000 p. 139) could be 
negatively impacted or distorted. Governmental economic aid could be an unfair advantage especially 
considering the competition between developed and developing countries which transforms in such a way in 
a struggle “against the treasuries of foreign governments”. One disputes further whether disciplines on the 
granting of subsidies should be introduced and whether the effective remedies together with the 
countervailing duty would help or, on the contrary, further distort the trade. 
As for legislative basis, fisheries subsidies are regulated only by the general subsidies rules of the 
WTO Subsidies Agreement (the SCM Agreement). Special WTO provisions are still lacking. The issue of 
subsidies within the WTO is regulated by the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures adopted 
during the Uruguay Round. The core idea behind the original version of this Agreement (the Agreement on 
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the GATT or the Subsidies Code) is 
inadmissibility of harm or harm threat to the trading partners as a result of the government subsidies to a 
domestic industry. 
The only existing definition of the term “subsidy” is contained in the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures. This is due to the lack of the consensus concerning the definition of the 
subsidy. Article 1 of the SCM Agreement provides for a two-part test to prove whether a subsidy takes place 
here. A government or a public body makes a financial contribution. A benefit from it must thereby be 
bestowed on the recipient of the contribution. 
A traffic light approach has been chosen: prohibited subsidies corresponding to the red light, and 
permitted and non-actionable: green light. Some subsidies are not prohibited under the Agreement, however 
if they bring detrimental effects, an action may still be taken against them (“yellow light” or “slow down”-
approach).Against the prohibited or actionable subsidies injuring the Member State one of the remedies is 
available: dispute settlement process or imposition of the countervailing duty after the appropriate 
investigation procedure. 
The SCM Agreement decides that such types of subsidies as research and development funding, 
subsidies to disadvantaged regions within a country and subsidies to adapt existing facilities to new 
environmental requirements do not distort trade. The issue arising is whether a special legal treatment is 
needed to the fisheries subsides. Can the existing SCM Agreement be applied to them? The dispute 
settlement system of the current SCM Agreement could be applied to the fisheries subsidies.  Or an issue of 
fisheries subsidies should be specifically addressed in this Agreement? 
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2.2.4 WTO strategy on fisheries subsidies 
 
The WTO is now looking for a “win-win” solution to protect the environment and preserve the interests in 
fisheries of especially developing states. 
At present, the WTO tries to develop the general approach to the issue of fisheries subsidies. One 
disputes whether one has to establish traffic-light approach or impose a broad-based prohibition. 
Under a more detailed consideration, one distinguishes between the “no need” approach, the "traffic 
light" approach and the "special and differential treatment" approach. 
Countries actively subsidizing their fisheries (Japan, South Korea, Canada) chose the “no need” 
approach. According to this approach, the fisheries industry does not need any special regulation. 
Furthermore, special treatment could rather lead to the fragmentation of the WTO subsidies regime and even 
possibly of the entire WTO system. Besides, the supporters of this approach doubt that overfishing was partly 
caused by the subsidies. They propose the cross-sectoral modification of certain provisions in the present 
SCM Agreement is admissible. 
The "traffic light" approach permits some subsidies (green light), prohibits some of them (red light) 
and makes some a subject to a complaint on the basis of their adverse trade effects (yellow light or “slow 
down” approach). "Friends of the Fish" (Australia, Chile, Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines 
and the United States), EU, China follow this approach. Representatives of this approach clearly define 
subsidies, which could be harmful and should be prohibited. For example, the U.S. proposes to prohibit 
subsidies directly promoting overcapacity and overfishing, or have other direct trade-distorting effects. Chile 
chooses more detailed approach and lists all kinds of commercial subsidies, which directly geared toward 
lowering costs, increasing revenues, raising production (by enhancing capacity), or directly promoting 
overcapacity and overfishing. EU prohibits “capacity enhancing subsidies”. Environmental-friendly subsidies 
supporting retraining, retirement of fishermen, safety improvement subsidies, subsidies promoting better 
quality or working conditions, more environmentally friendly fishing methods and subsidies for the 
scrapping of vessels and the withdrawal of capacity are permitted.   
New Zealand proposes to prohibit all subsidies causing overcapacity and overfishing, as well as other 
trade distortions. According to this approach the subsidizing country has to notify an amber light subsidy, 
otherwise it has to prove that this subsidy did not cause trade injury.  
The "special and differential treatment" approach favours and makes some exclusion for small 
vulnerable developing coastal states by developed or more advanced developing countries. 
The broad prohibition of subsidies would be difficult to achieve. In general, fisheries subsidies are 
supported by the strong lobby of fishing (and even food) industry. Besides, subsidies promoting the reducing 
of the fleets’ capacity seem to be a reasonable measure in this situation. The position of the “no need” 
approach seems to be also not very stable, since the conditionality of the overcapacity, overfishing and 
fisheries subsidies is more or less acknowledged. Probably, the traffic light approach would be the chosen 
path for the legal regulation in this field. However, the sphere of the prohibited subsidies expects to be one of 
the most controversial issues, prolonging the development of WTO disciplines of fisheries subsidies. 
Another controversial issue is whether the existing SCM Agreement is appropriate to deal with the 
fisheries subsidies or a special treatment is necessary. The matter of subsidies in the fishery sector also gets 
complicated by the fact that the disclosure and notification of fisheries subsidies are very poor. All fishing 
countries apply them. The effectiveness of the complaint under the existing SCM Agreement is rather 
doubtful. Not depending on the following legal destiny of fisheries subsidies, WTO rules on this matter have 
to comply in generally with the SCM Agreement. 
 
3. The role and participation of other international organizations 
 
However, the WTO reaction will not be sufficient to solve the problem of fisheries subsidies. The 
cooperation of states and other international organizations both at the international and national levels would 
be necessary. 
The existing international fisheries commission designed to deal with fisheries conservation, 
management and scientific research don’t fulfil their predestination on a full extent and represent rather some 
kind of “user clubs” (van Dyke, Zaelke, Hewison, 1993 p. 231). But others like FAO, OECD, APEC, UNEP 
etc. put their efforts into this issue. At least the joint development of data and methodologies and research on 
the environmental and trade implications of fisheries subsidies will be necessary. In part, they are already 
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carrying them out. The FAO analyzes the issue of the fisheries subsidies, overfishing and overcapacity. 1999 
International Plan of Action on the Management of Fishing Capacity contained the call to the FAO Members 
to reduce or even eliminate harmful subsidies. OECD studies the issue of governmental financial transfers 
(GFTs) in fisheries and their impact upon it. The APEC is also analyzing the fisheries subsidies in light of the 
SCM Agreement application. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The 1982 UNCLOS provides for the exclusive sovereign right to manage fisheries resources up to 200 nm 
from the shoreline to the coastal state. The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement) adopted 
in 1995 obliges states to conservation and sustainable management of fish stocks.  
Consequently, more or less states themselves are responsible for their politics with the subsidies in 
fisheries. However, separate national efforts on reducing or elimination of fisheries subsidies won’t bring too 
much. In opposite, it would rather reflect the fisheries management slogan of David Cushing ‘sink every 
other boat but mine’. Or if one rephrases Stephen Cunningham (1985), what one country loses, immediately 
gains the other one. In other words, each coastal state is interested in protection of his own fish stocks. Any 
other country tries to reduce this protection fence as much as possible. If one state stops to increase its fleet’s 
capacity, his place will be sooner or later be occupied by the other one until the global international regime is 
developed. In addition, a couple of nations are not able to find a common solution on the global issue of 
fishing. During the UNLOSC III, some participants even proposed to abolish the freedom of fishing and 
establish “the species approach to fisheries management”. 
This regime requires not only the coordinate work of governments and international organizations. 
The significant contribution of universities, fishermen, scientists is “a must”.  
If economy is a help to biology, why can’t biology be of help to the economy. The overfishing 
problem could be (in part) solved by the farming of fishing resources. Moreover, the statistics shows that 
over 15 000 fish species are still not identified. Perhaps, nature will help humanity. Environmentalists stress 
that the proper fisheries management could assist almost totally to eliminate the harmful impact on the 
environment. 
Over one half of the world trade in fish and fish products belongs to the developing countries. 
Paragraph 28 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration makes an express reference to the importance of fishing 
sector to the developing countries. It is not occasional. The fishing industry means work for 36 million 
people each year only in primary sectors. Before taking any concrete decision on the reduction or abolition of 
the fisheries’ subsidies, one has also to consider them. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Types of subsidies (Based on the information from Iudicello, 1999 p. 61) 
 
TYPE OF CAPITAL ACTIVITY EXAMPLES IMPACT 
 
Direct income 
 
 
Support Price supports, grants to remove 
vessels temporarily from a 
fishery 
Support the  
economically marginal 
kinds of fishing 
 
Producers’ 
variable costs 
 
Reduction Fuel tax exemptions Attraction of 
investments into the 
industry 
Capital Facilitation 
of use 
Low-interest loans, loan 
guarantees that reduce the risk 
of commercial loans, tax 
concessions on investments 
Attraction of investment 
into a fishery, especially 
when the support of 
commercial banks is in 
question 
Government 
charges for 
exploitation of a 
public resource 
 
 
Depreciation Favorable (or even absent) 
charging of foreign and 
domestic fleets for access to the 
fisheries 
Promotion of existing 
and bringing in of new 
fishermen 
Costs of 
subsidiary 
activities 
Reduction Subsidies to the shipbuilding 
industry (lowering of costs for 
vessel construction), fish ports 
or fish-processing facilities 
Benefits fishing fleets 
indirectly 
 
 
Scheme 2. Fishery resources. 
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Source: Review of the State of World Fishery Resources, FAO 1997, The State of World Fisheries and 
Aquaculture, FAO 2000 
 
 
 
